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1. Executive Summary 
 
 The revelations of mass surveillance by Edward Snowden have highlighted the potential 
threat to the privacy of journalists’ communication and data, calling into question the ability 
to protect anonymous sources. 
 Threats to the privacy of journalists can come from a number of sources including 
government agencies, employers and service providers. 
 There are a number of tools available to help maintain privacy of communication but using 
these can sometimes draw unwanted attention in themselves and there is no tool that is 
100% safe. 
 There is a need for training and awareness-raising amongst journalists, and media 
organisations will expect the next generation of journalists to be more ’data savvy’ -
something that is not yet the case. 
 There are a number of simple steps you can take to increase data security such as 
continuous ’password hygine’ and an awareness of privacy and location settings on devices 
like mobile phones. 
 When assessing risk to a source, journalists need to be aware of the compromising potential 
of electronic communications and may need to go ’offline’ for the most risky of cases. 
 
2. Introduction 
It was a major scoop by any standard, but the Edward Snowden revelations also sent a chill down 
the spines of journalists. They confirmed what many already suspected. The scope of mass 
surveillance and the extent of the authorities’ power is especially troubling for a profession that 
places uncompromising source protection above most, if not all, other professional virtues. More 
worrying, journalists as a group often combine concentration of sensitive information with a less 
than perfect grasp of technical know-how. 
Journalists are forced to consider what protection they can guarantee their sources. The conclusions 
some draw are dismaying. Can any technology be trusted, when hardware and software appear as 
leaky as sieves? Can any legal guarantees be relied upon, when decisions are made in obscure 
systems with scant transparency, where even privileged communications between lawyers and 
clients are subject to eavesdropping? Even journalists that recognise a government need for law 
enforcement and intelligence are worried. 
It all boils down to a single worrying question: is source protection dead? While the answer may be 
‘no’, even an optimist would deny that there is a new and significant threat.  
But while many have described initial reactions of shock and confusion, some attempts to tackle 
these concerns have followed. While the Snowden revelations shed light on the extent of snooping, 
they also suggest there are tools that offer some degree of protection. Using relatively simple steps, 
journalists can vastly improve their ability to protect information, and journalists are expanding their 
toolboxes with these skills. 
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Yet absolute promises of security should be met with some suspicion, and some journalists 
interviewed for this report describe abandoning digital communications altogether in the most 
sensitive of cases. There are also concerns that the discussion has become too technically advanced, 
or that it focuses solely on solutions with state surveillance in mind when few journalists will face so 
advanced an adversary.  
The goal of this report is to offer a very basic introduction to some of the main digital security 
challenges faced by journalists today, such as eavesdropping on wired communications, protection 
of data stored on drives, and email communications. We also seek to introduce attempts to tackle 
these issues, such as training, software, legal challenges, or even “going old school”. 
It’s aimed at journalists or others seeking a basic inroad into the subject and we hope it will be of 
some interest to those more experienced in the field. It will draw on real-life examples relevant not 
only to those pursuing global scoops on the Wikileaks level, but also more routine reporting on 
crime, employment and social issues. 
We hope it will prove both interesting and useful, serve as one first step on the road towards a 
strengthened source protection, and offer some guidance in where to proceed from there. Please let 
us have your feedback via Polis@lse.ac.uk . 
3. What are we looking at? 
3.1 Identifying threats and assessing risks 
The first question to anyone trying to figure out how to make their communications more secure is: 
Against what?1 It’s easy to get caught up in reasoning about how to protect your data from state 
intelligence agencies, when the biggest threat many sources face will be their employer, their 
colleagues, or social acquaintances. 
Many of the risks journalists need to consider are less about what the NSA or GCHQ know and more 
about what people around the source can glean, what overly talkative network administrators can 
read in your emails, what Internet Service Providers (ISP) record, and what the owner of that site 
you visited 20 times a day under the course of your investigation can tell from those visits. 
While the issue of state level surveillance needs to be taken into consideration and the responsibility 
to protect sources is wide in scope, consider what the most pressing risks you face are. While heavily 
encrypted email and data traffic may be necessary, it may be more urgent to tackle basic mistakes 
                                                          
1 Anyone investigating this subject might encounter the term Operations Security or “OPSEC” which 
has made its way from military terminology into privacy lingo. An associated term is Information 
Security or “INFOSEC”. In short, OPSEC is the process of assessing threat and possible counter-
measures in a wide sense that goes beyond data protection (which would usually fall under 
INFOSEC). While the Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy-lingo may seem a bit tiresome at times, but it’s worth 
considering the difference between the two and what they mean for journalists.  
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such as communicating sensitive information via work phones or computers, storing unencrypted 
sensitive information online, sloppy password management, or publishing photos with embedded 
location data. 
For instance, few prying employers are likely be able to pressure companies like Google or Facebook 
into handing over conversations, or force the company that built your mobile phone to grant access 
to your stored data. Law enforcement agencies on the other hand can do just that. Advanced 
encryption may protect the contents of your communications but also set off warning bells that 
draw attention. Driving around in a black SUV car without number plates will obscure what’s inside, 
but will likely be perceived as more than a bit suspicious. On the other hand, unencrypted data is 
normally easy to eavesdrop on and even more common encryption that will not alert an 
eavesdropper might be easy to break.  
One problem with assessing the threats you face is 
the fact that the capabilities of the authorities and 
other organisations are often unknown. What 
Snowden made public was information on capabilities 
up to a point in time, not necessarily what is possible 
today. Another point is that data can easily be stored 
for an indefinite time and it is difficult to know what 
information might become compromising in the 
future. For this reason a policy of “better safe than 
sorry” is advisable, and it is important to understand that really protecting a source may well mean 
going above and beyond the most pressing threat. 
Frank Smyth, executive director of the firm Global Journalist Security and senior advisor for 
journalist security at Committee to Protect Journalists, emphasises that journalists need to consider 
first and foremost what they’re up against. In some cases, simply dividing communication between 
different accounts and services will make a big difference in how difficult tracking communications 
will be. 
“It depends on your profile and that’s why you want different ways of communicating. It’s 
about always keeping it in a variety of places so nobody can get it all, unless they’re devoting 
a whole room full of people to look at you,” he says. “That’s the way to stay safe, I think. 
Basic operational security online.” 
Smyth believes that at times the discussion is too focused on advanced tools and strategies with 
adversaries like the NSA or CIA in mind. For some people it is a relevant threat level to consider, but 
not for everyone, he says. For instance, he advises strongly against actively using PGP or TOR to 
encrypt every file or email saying that he first of all does not know if any technology is trustworthy, 
and adding that such an approach would be adapting to a threat level far higher than necessary. He 
compares that with teaching every single person dentistry rather than basic dental hygiene: 
“I teach people basic things – how to brush and floss their teeth. They need to know the risks 
to make choices. You start going into some tools and it just confuses people.” 
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Thinking carefully about what risks you face is key to working out how to communicate more 
securely. Different people may then draw different conclusions (some, for instance, will recommend 
encrypting as much as possible to make specific data less suspicious while others will advise some 
degree of hiding in plain sight) but it is important to do the research and have the discussion. 
3.2 Legal and policy challenges  
Source protection, source confidentiality, reporter’s privilege – there are many different labels used 
to describe the phenomena. Today the onus on journalists to protect the identity or other 
information about their sources is a well-established principle in many parts of the world. For many 
journalists, few professional sins rank more grave than to expose, or fail to protect, a source. In 
Sweden where source protection is enshrined in the constitution, failure to protect an anonymous 
source can land a journalist in prison. 
Few countries offer this level of legal protection for the sources of journalists, but in many places 
there is some protection in theory at least. In the United States there are varying shield laws 
depending on the state in question. In Europe, the European Court of Humans Rights has ruled that 
the protection of journalists’ sources is a basic condition for press freedom. 
At the same time, source protection as a principle has regularly clashed with other interests of both 
public and private actors. There have, for instance, been numerous examples of eavesdropping on 
journalists and their sources in European countries despite the rulings of the ECHR, and the 
perceived sanctity of source protection has been questioned both in connection to law enforcement 
and intelligence gathering. The current United States government has been described as unusually 
aggressive in pursuing leaks from within the administration. 
Revelations of mass surveillance and other telecommunication eavesdropping have called into 
question to what degree source protection can be guaranteed, and some journalists argue that 
surveillance effectively makes source protection impossible. This in turn has led to multiple new 
legal challenges with policy change as an aim, in the hope that the conflict between the protection 
of sensitive communication and mass surveillance will lead to limitations on the latter. 
There are many on the technical and privacy activism side who express scepticism that legal and 
policy reform will have any effect, pointing to cases where laws governing privileged 
communications between lawyers and their clients in the UK have failed to deter surveillance by law 
enforcement.  With this in mind, the legal perspective on source protection online and what the 
legal consequences of surveillance or weak data security are will not be the focus of this report. 
3.3  On the wire 
What we do on the internet is continuously monitored not only by authorities for surveillance 
purposes. It is done by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), company IT desks, companies providing the 
sites and services we access online, and many others. All unprotected traffic through a network can 
be monitored by its administrators, or anyone who can get similar access including authorities or 
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criminals. Furthermore, internet traffic does not only travel from point A to point B, but rather skips 
around servers all over the world each with separate administrators. 
An unencrypted email or file sent through a network is no safer than a postcard in the mail and can 
be read by anyone monitoring that network. This includes data leaving VPN or TOR networks 
(described further below). Data can also be saved indefinitely, which is important as it’s not always 
clear what might be deemed sensitive in the future. And beyond the actual contents of a message 
being visible, there is also “metadata” – information about the message such as sender and 
recipient, which may in itself be damning enough. 
One way of protecting your traffic is encryption. Edward 
Snowden has said that encryption works, and that properly 
implemented strong crypto systems “are one of the few things 
that you can rely on".  While proper implementation is a 
significant undertaking, this at least suggests that data 
protection is possible, one of the few things in the Snowden 
revelations that the security-minded have found encouraging. 
Different types of encryption are readily available, including strong encryption that will not be easily 
cracked even by very powerful computers. Many people use encrypted internet traffic every day 
without even being aware of it.  
But even if someone monitoring communications cannot see the contents of communication, they 
can see that it is being used. That may be enough to get journalists and their sources into trouble. 
For instance, tools that protect the contents of an email may not offer any protection of metadata – 
information about the nature of the communication including the sender and recipient – and that 
can be damning enough in itself. 
This section will look into the basics of internet traffic encryption and what can be done to protect 
the content of online traffic from eavesdropping.  
3.3.1 Basic encryption - HTTPS 
Someone monitoring a network cannot necessarily see everything you do in it, even if you’ve never 
taken a single precaution. Many sites use what is known as HTTPS (short for HTTP Secure) 
encryption. When supported, HTTPS can protect against eavesdropping or tampering with your 
traffic, but will not anonymise or hide the identity of sites you visit, how long you visit them or home 
much data you download - only the actual content of the traffic. HTTPS offers some basic protection 
but it is limited and should not be mistaken for solid security. Using the postcard analogy, HTTPS is 
an envelope that can, when the site in question allows it, cover your letter but not the address of the 
recipient or sender. 
That said, HTTPS is better than nothing against some threats. For many internet browsers (such as 
Mozilla Firefox and Google’s Chrome) there is also an add-on called “HTTPS Everywhere” that when 
installed will help activate HTTPS security on some sites. Note though that HTTPS Everywhere works 
by activating pre-existing HTTPS features in sites; it does not create them or lend protection to sites 
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that do not have HTTPS functionality. If you want to be anonymous online or advise a source on how 
to do the same, more protection is needed. 
3.3.2  Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
Another tool to encrypt traffic is known as a Virtual Private Network (VPN). VPNs can, for instance, 
be used to connect to internal company networks from home or abroad. But they are also used to 
encrypt internet traffic, altering the user’s apparent location, and to obscure the source of traffic to 
and from a given website. 
A VPN creates a tunnel to disrupt the standard travel from A to B. Instead traffic travels from A into 
the encrypted VPN network tunnel, it then emerges from the “tunnel exit” and proceeds to B, and 
then takes the same route back. Proxy servers, which are a different and less secure type of 
intermediaries, have similar functions but usually lack the strong VPN encryption. 
VPN’s can offer encrypted high-speed traffic, and are 
available from a great many providers. That said, the 
provider holds the cryptographic key and could see 
your traffic. A VPN could, for instance, decide to comply 
with authorities and pass sensitive data along although 
many say they do not retain data or hand it over. VPNs 
may still be a useful option, depending on what 
potential threats you see to your traffic. 
3.3.3  TOR 
Anyone that has encountered discussions on online privacy and information security may have heard 
of the TPR project, or The Onion Router. TOR offers encryption and hides the path internet traffic is 
taking, offering some but not absolute anonymity. Tor was developed originally in the United States 
with the US navy in mind, in order to hide and protect US government communications. It still 
receives most of it’s funding from the US. TOR is used by everything from law enforcement and 
intelligence agents to journalists and political dissidents, as well as criminals. 
TOR advocates argue that despite the service being constructed to protect American 
communications, including that of spies, its open source transparency demonstrates that it does 
offer a more trustworthy security than non-open source options.  TOR works by sending your traffic 
through an encrypted network where it jumps from one point to another, combining strong 
encryption with a large degree of anonymity as no single point can see both the origin and 
destination of the traffic. 
It is important to note though that while traffic travelling into and through the TOR network is 
encrypted, the last step – exiting from network to the final destination – is not encrypted. Anything 
written in plain text will still be readable, which means that it may be important to also use other 
encryption to protect the contents of your traffic. It also needs to be mentioned that there have 
been some concerns about the ability of major powers to eavesdrop on TOR if they control enough 
nodes in the system from leading TOR developers. 
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So why not always use TOR? First of all, Tor-browsing can be very slow, as speeds will depend on the 
capacity of the node servers. Secondly, some countries, especially ones with authoritarian 
governments, may block TOR access. Thirdly, and importantly, someone monitoring your traffic may 
be able to see if you are using TOR and as far as conspicuous traffic goes, it is fairly conspicuous. 
There are examples where merely using TOR has landed individuals in serious trouble. 
3.3.4 Emails  
Email communication today is ubiquitous. In 2015, the amount of emails sent worldwide in a day 
topped 196 billion messages. But email messages can easily be both monitored and saved and 
emails can be vulnerable to hackers. Among journalists, further concerns have been raised as media 
outlets have adopted cloud-based solutions outside their own physical reach to handle their emails 
rather than running their own servers.  
So what can we do to protect our email? There are commercial options available, but you may also 
be familiar with the abbreviation PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). It is a well-recognised type of email 
encryption, commonly used but requiring a bit of practice. 
Basically, PGP works by the user generating a random private key that they keep to themselves, and 
then a public key that can be shared. Messages sent to the recipient are encrypted by the sender 
using that user’s public key, and the recipient then unlocks the scrambled encrypted text using his or 
her private key. 
One simplified way of describing it is that you create a number of locks (public keys) and share them 
around. Anyone can use one of these to lock a message they are sending to you. But all of these 
locks can only be opened with one key (private key) that only you hold. When you want to return the 
email you encrypt it in the reverse direction with the recipient’s lock (or public key), and the 
recipient will unlock the message using their private key. 
A common open source PGP version is abbreviated GnuPG or GPG and is compatible with many 
different types of software programs. Using GPG will offer strong encryption protection for your 
communications and is one of the most widely used and trusted forms of online communication in 
circles concerned with serious data security. In many countries, introductory training sessions in PGP 
use are offered by colleagues or online privacy organisations. 
3.3.5 Messaging services 
Despite the prevalence of emails, it should come as no surprise that there are today a range of 
different messenger services available online. Social media sites especially have grown massively and 
today account for a large share of all internet traffic. From a security perspective however, such sites 
generally pose serious problems. Aside from the fact that collecting and selling user data is the 
essence of their business model, it may be difficult to confirm the identity of the person you’re 
speaking with, accounts are easily hacked, and phones easily lost. 
There is however an array of messenger services using the “Off The Record” (OTR) protocol that 
offer a safer option. OTR messengers offer encrypted instant messaging conversations as well as 
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features to confirm the identity of the person you’re communicating with. If you happen to lose 
control of your encryption keys, previous conversations will not be compromised. Also, after the 
conversation is over the messages will not carry any digital signatures so you could plausible deny 
any messages have come from you. 
Some examples of OTR chat clients are Pidgin (cross-platform), Adium (OS X), ChatSecure (for mobile 
devices) and Miranda (Windows). Google’s Google Talk service also uses the term “off the record” 
but does not offer this type of protection. 
3.4 On the drive 
In the section above we looked at how we can protect our data traffic, but what about what we 
leave behind on our hard drives and memory sticks? The computer or cell phone of a journalist can 
contain a treasure trove of sensitive information. The first rule of thumb is to always password-
protect any devices you going to use, but this may not help against the determined. 
In this section we are going to look at different types of disk encryption that can allow you to protect 
a computer, file or thumb drive if they would fall into the wrong hands. It is also a good idea to 
encrypt any data you intend to upload outside your own physical reach, for instance on an online 
server. And again, encryption will not make your data invisible, only unreadable to anyone without 
the key. It may still be clear that you are using encryption, in many places itself suspicious enough. 
3.4.1 Disk encryption 
There are many commercial encryption options available, for instance your computer’s operating 
system, (such as Apple’s OSX system) or phone system (such as Google’s Android) may well offer the 
option of encryption. There is also a wide range of alternatives in the market for encryption software 
that promises to protect your data, bundles of files or hard drive as a whole.  
Often commercial software for cryptography will be easily accessible, easily used and offer a strong 
encryption – depending however on who the perceived threat is. In general, as with standard data 
traffic, there are concerns about to whom companies can hand over data and the risk of back doors 
allowing authorities or others direct access to purportedly safe data. 
Certainly, the revelations of Edward Snowden have showed many of these concerns to be well-
founded. Therefore you need to think about what protection commercial encryption firms actually 
promise to deliver if authorities ask them to hand over your encryption keys, and if you think they 
might do so despite promising otherwise. 
That said, in most cases there are strong and user-friendly commercial software options available 
are used for much of what journalists do online. If you require a higher degree of safety, or for some 
specific reason believe that typical commercial file encryption is not what you need, there are non-
commercial licenses. 
There are several different options but one open-source option that has been popularly used for 
some time is called TrueCrypt. TrueCrypt has had many advantages including being free to use and 
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with advanced options for encrypting hard drives, USB-sticks, single files and much more with 
comparative ease. TrueCrypt was however discontinued during May 2014, and a message posted on 
its site stated that it may contain unfixed bugs. The discontinuation of TrueCrypt unleashed much 
speculation both with regards to the reason for this decision, but also with regards to how safe its 
encryption actually is. However there has been a project to independently audit the software and no 
specific back doors have been found and made public.  Many still use TrueCrypt and unless you 
believe a major power is coming after your data it is often considered comparatively safe in the 
sense that it’s one of the better options accessible. 
Another useful feature with TrueCrypt was that it would allow you to encrypt a file using two 
different passwords where the content would vary depending on which one you entered. This allows 
for what is often referred to as plausible deniability. This means that someone who finds the 
encrypted file and demands you unlock it can be given one password (to a less sensitive or even false 
content) without jeopardising the “real” content that would only be shown if the other password 
was entered.  
During the end of 2014, alternatives have however emerged, such as CipherShed which is derived 
from TrueCrypt’s code, but where all the code has been made public to comply with open-source 
guidelines. The individuals behind CipherShed are also not anonymous, which was the case with 
TrueCrypt. Another similar project, also based on a fork of TrueCrypt is called VeraCrypt, but anyone 
interested in this will need to inform themselves on what is the latest tool.  
3.4.2 Hardware vs Software 
 
A serious concern in any discussion of source 
protection is how far we can trust any of the 
devices we use to securely protect our data. This 
applies both to the hardware, the physical bits and 
pieces that make up a device, as well as the 
software, that is the programs we run on that 
hardware. 
Regarding hardware, concerned voices have been 
raised with regards to what access might be 
available to the companies that produce them, and by extension authorities that could be granted 
access. The Edward Snowden revelations suggest that intelligence services have been able to 
remotely access computers without even needing them to be connected to the internet. Some 
people physically remove pieces from the computer such as Bluetooth chips, microphones, or 
cameras out of concern that these could be remotely accessed. While some of these measures may 
seem extreme, it is useful to at least consider that hardware in computers, phones, tablets, as well 
routers and other related hardware, may be accessible to exceptionally powerful organisations. As 
Snowden revealed, this is not a hypothetical situation. 
With software, there are different concerns. On one hand, there are concerns that harmful malware 
programs may be used to spy on computers. Keylogger programs that store the key strokes typed 
   
 
12 
 
into a computer, programs that record images from the screen or record conversations in programs 
such as Skype, or malware that offers direct back door access into the computers operating system – 
all of these are used by criminals, the casually bored, jealous spouses, and government authorities to 
spy on individuals. Making sure that the programs you use are updated and that antivirus protection 
is active are both important, but often users will be fooled into installing these programs themselves 
through social rather than computer engineering. When that happens no encryption will be able to 
protect you, and if you suspect your computer may have been infected or compromised you may 
have no other option than to wipe the hard drive and make a clean install of your operating system. 
The second concern with software is wider, and more difficult to tackle. Simply put, it is based on the 
concern that any software - be it operating systems or other programs - that are not open source 
and easily audited independently may be vulnerable to eavesdropping. The main concern is that 
programs may have back door access written into the code that allows direct access, access that may 
be exploited by the companies themselves, authorities, hackers, or anyone else that gains access. 
This concern also extends to any encryption that is not open source. 
While the closed nature of many commercial programs means that these suspicions often cannot be 
definitively proven, the Snowden documents reveal that large tech companies have been granting 
backdoor access and handing over data, arguing that they are legally required to comply. As with 
hardware, the back door issues are not a hypothetical according to the Snowden documents. 
3.4.3 Tails 
One option that will not be discussed in detail here but deserves to be mentioned is Tails, a version 
of the operating system Linux constructed with privacy in mind. Tails is intended to be run from a 
USB memory stick, a memory card or a DVD disk. It is made to leave no trace on the computer where 
it is used, and runs all traffic through TOR. It also includes a large number of programs that can be 
used to encrypt, obscure or otherwise protect data. Tails is an extremely useful tool if high level 
security is necessary, and anyone interested can access further reading online.  
3.4.4 Detekt – Amnesty 
 
For a slightly different perspective, the rights group Amnesty international recently launched the 
service Detekt to search computers for the most well-known malware risks used by some 
governments that spy on computers. The background was in part concern that many activists or 
other people targeted may lack advanced software to fight malware or viruses, or old computers. At 
the same time it is also about awareness-raising, as the scope of malware that could really be 
addressed is limited. 
 
3.5 On your phone 
Smart phones with advanced high-definition cameras and high-speed internet services have had a 
big impact on journalism allowing the telling of stories in new and exciting ways. Unfortunately, 
there are also risks associated with carrying around small computers that contain not only an array 
of sensors, lists of contacts and communications, but also make combining this information and 
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passing it on technologically simple. One absolute must, however, is using a password to protect 
your telephone. Never have a phone without a passcode of some form. 
3.5.1 Phone networks 
Much of what you do on your phone generates data by which you can be identified. Call logs from 
land lines as well as mobile phones are stored. For regular phone calls some kind of court order or 
permission is often needed if authorities wish to wiretap phone calls. The metadata of your phones 
calls are often easier to access and can easily be stored over time. French authorities, for instance, 
have admitted that intelligence agencies obtained detailed lists of calls made by journalists at Le 
Monde. Not only authorities can do this. In Sweden there have been examples where employers 
requested the phone call lists of employees using work telephones. In this way calls made from 
employees to journalists have been revealed, in at least one case leading to an employee losing their 
job.  
From a technical perspective, your mobile 
telephone, as well as your SIM-card, also 
carries information that can be used to 
identify who you are as well as your 
location. If you need to meet someone in 
person, agree on a time and place and then 
leave your phone behind, as someone 
registering your phone as well as the 
sources on the same place at the same time 
is a give-away. Turning the phone off or 
even removing the battery may not protect you. 
In extremely sensitive situations where phone communication cannot be avoided, it is better to 
meet in person or to buy simple, brand new telephone with unregistered SIM-cards for both your 
source and yourself. “Burners”, as they are called, are a safer bet, but will still leave traces and 
should not be kept or used longer than necessary. 
3.5.2 Internet traffic 
The risks associated with using the internet on your phone are the same as with other internet use, 
except that phones will usually have access to even more information about you such as GPS 
location data. Services such as VPNs and Tor, explained in an earlier section, are available for mobile 
devices however. 
A smart phone contains an array of sensors, microphones and GPS. Always make sure to look 
through the security and privacy options in your phone. Consider turning off, for instance, location 
services entirely except for when you really need them. This basic level of protection will only 
however prevent some of the haemorrhaging of data to apps and the companies that make them; it 
will not prevent someone with remote access to the phone’s operating system or hardware.  
Similarly, think about whether it is a good idea that apps automatically upload data such as photos 
online or have access to your saved contacts. Often the answer will be ‘no’. 
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3.5.3 Encryption 
 
Many phones today do offer encryption of the contents. For Apple’s line of iPhones, for instance, 
your data will be protected on its flash drive as long as you have a password. On Android phones you 
will often find the option to encrypt under security options. But as with any commercial software, 
there is no guarantee against access or authorities demanding access from the company. Apple have 
recently said they will no longer hand over information to law enforcement agencies, but other 
methods of extraction may make this irrelevant. 
3.5.4 Apps 
Apps can either help protect your data, or make it vulnerable. As mentioned previously, look 
through the privacy and security options of the apps you have installed and consider carefully what 
access they actually need to, for instance, contacts or locations.  
Meanwhile, apps such as RedPhone and TextSecure for Android offer encrypted phone calls and text 
messaging. Similar apps for the iPhone are TigerText and CoverMe. Also worth looking into is 
SilentCircle’s suite, as well as Guardian Project apps that allow internet access via Tor networks, 
tools for Off The Record messaging, and more. 
3.6 Passwords 
3.6.1    Strong Passwords 
Strong passwords, as well as what is often described as “password hygiene”, are essential to any 
serious attempts at securing your data. It may seem tedious to continuously change passwords, to 
avoid reusing passwords, and to select passwords that cannot be easily cracked - even seasoned 
data security wonks can find this challenging – but it is simply a necessity. Different systems can be 
devised to protect passwords, and while we won’t go into detail here, the usual recommendations of 
choosing many different types of characters are all sensible. And while tools for cracking passwords 
today are strong, a long password will be much harder to crack than a short one. 
It is also useful considering that passwords do not necessarily get hacked using brute technical force, 
but often by social engineering and tricking people into divulging their passwords. Be extremely 
suspicious of any requests for your password if you feel the least bit uncertain. Other threats are 
“keylogger” malware programs monitor your keystrokes, or hackers that manage to get hold of 
password data from one service and the use your login information to access other services. In short, 
any hygiene be it password or physical, will take a bit of effort but it is in everyone’s best interest 
that we both wash our hands and choose passwords with care.  
3.6.2 Two-step verification 
One useful function that more and more online services are allowing users to activate is two-step 
verification when you log in to your account. It is what many may have been doing for a long time 
when logging into their bank accounts online, using some sort of digital device that generates a code 
used to log in. The difference being that most of the time the device you will now use is your phone. 
   
 
15 
 
If you do not have two-step verification activated, usually you will enter your login details and your 
password, and you will be able to access your account. With two-step verification there is, as the 
name suggest, a second step. Upon logging in to your account, a text message or code will be sent to 
your selected device (most often your telephone) and you will then need to enter this before your 
can use your account. Some find that this is somewhat tedious, but it is a small step that will vastly 
improve security and you can often tell accounts to remember the computer or other device you 
logged in on so that you will not be asked for a code every time you log in. 
Examples of services that employ two-step verification are Google’s services (Gmail, Google drive et 
cetera), Facebook, Twitter, DropBox and Apple’s iCloud. 
3.6.3 Password managers 
Another potentially useful tool is a password manager that will allow you to gather passwords for 
different services and keep them on one central key-ring. Some of these password manager services 
will allow you to login directly to the different sites you might be using and also let you copy and 
paste passwords in order to avoid keylogging malware. 
At the same time you are gathering all your keys in one place, as with any key-ring, and if you lose 
your password or someone else gets hold of it you might be in even worse trouble. As with any 
programs, at least those that are not open source, there is also the risk of backdoor access available 
to both the programmers behind the code as well as authorities.  
 
4. What are some current projects? 
4.1 Training 
While the lack of data security skills among journalists has often been lamented, few schools of 
journalism offered their students much practical training until recently. One main reason may have 
been that the skills were simply not there with older generations of colleagues and that there were 
not the teachers available. 
More recently however, as the issue has received greater attention and grown more prominent in 
the discussion of data security, schools have increasingly been offering at least some basic training in 
operational data security. Moreover, professional journalists have been able to choose from a 
growing selection of courses and training opportunities. 
One increasingly common tool to boost data security and digital source protection skills for 
journalists has been targeting professional journalists already in the business. The reasoning has 
been that active professionals are the ones who these skills the most, and that they are already 
working and potentially handling sensitive information in an unsafe way. Training sessions are being 
conducted both hands-on through workshops or programs, as well as online in the form of Massive 
Open Online Courses (abbreviated “MOOCS”) or by other means. 
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In general, many who train journalists in data security 
issues describe a growing awareness of the risk at hand, 
and the need to address these through hands-on 
training. 
Fundamentally however, the skill level in many media 
organisations is still very weak, according to several of 
those interviewed with regards to their work in this 
area. Anders Thoresson, a freelance journalist who has 
educated professional journalists in Sweden as well as 
students, describes one case where he asked members of a Swedish local newspaper how many of 
them had any type of lock screen password on their smartphone. He was genuinely baffled when 
only half or so said yes: 
“For God’s sake, I asked, don’t you have your internal editorial email messages in those? Well 
yes, they said, but it’s so inconvenient to enter it. I thought this was a blanket excuse that no 
one actually uses.” 
Thoresson adds that the realm of data security and digital source protection will be something that 
older journalists already working will expect from younger journalists fresh out of journalism 
schools. This opens both for an opportunity for recently educated journalists to offer badly needed 
skills, but also means that the expectations of recent graduates has increased. 
The students Anders Thoresson has been training have mainly been studying at the University of 
Gothenburg’s department of journalism (JMG). JMG is an institution that prides itself on its 
investigative focus, and has during the recent years increased training in digital security. One striking 
fact has been that despite belonging to a generation often touted as “digital natives”, few if any 
students in a class understand how the internet works and how to use it more securely, Thoresson 
says. The main goal is therefore to instil some understanding of internet infrastructure and a security 
conscious mind-set: 
“Somehow there’s a sense that the internet is a dangerous place but not of how that applies 
to journalism as a profession. My point when I leave is not that they should have acquired a 
wide battery of software that will always work, but rather the notion that the internet can be 
a risky place and that they understand this the day they might need it.” 
Arjen Kamphuis, an information security expert who has been working in IT since the mid 1990s, has 
been training journalists, journalism students in computer security for years. He is one of the authors 
of ‘The Centre for Investigative Journalism Handbook’ on information security for journalists and 
speaks regularly at journalism conferences on issues of information security. 
Kamphuis says that he continues to be amazed that most investigative journalists do not appear to 
have spent any time considering issues of information security, despite all that is now known. He 
likens the computer skills level of an investigative journalist between 25 and 55 years of age to that 
of average European 12 year-olds: 
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“Apparently not enough people have been arrested or worse in order to wake people up 
about this…..The more people that do more teaching can only be a good thing, because 
clearly a lot more training is needed.” 
On the other hand, Kamphuis emphasises that the Edward Snowden revelations show that tools 
such as properly implemented encryption and TOR network usage can allow a high level of security, 
and that these are things that can be learned. Ultimately, he believes, it comes down to whether 
journalists are willing to spend a few days learning how to use tools:  
“I’ve seen journalists do this and I’ve seen journalism students do this,” he says. “It’s really all 
about motivation. The technology certain isn’t perfect, but it’s now at a level where anyone 
who wants can learn, can.” 
4.2      Handbooks 
Another type of material increasingly available for educational or training purposes is the handbook. 
Examples include Information Security for Journalists from the Centre for Investigative Journalism in 
the United Kingdom, The Swedish handbook Digitalt Källskydd produced by the .SE foundation in 
cooperation with the Swedish Union of Journalists, and Manual de Seguridad Digital y Móvil 
produced by Freedom House and the International Center for Journalists. Other guides, such as the 
Journalist Security Guide from the Committee to Protect Journalists, include chapters on information 
security and the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Surveillance Self-Defense toolkit is kept up-to-date 
online. 
Though varying in size and scope, the basic idea of producing clear and easily shareable guides to 
digital security is similar and understandably attractive. They are available in several different 
languages and there is work ongoing to translate several of these into further. 
Silkie Carlo, an activist and along with Kamphuis co-author of the Centre for Investigative Journalism 
handbook, says that the reception has been encouraging and that there is a clear need for 
handbooks of this type. Some use it pre-emptively, she says, while others will go looking when a 
situation arises. The former is preferable because acquiring the necessary skills may be difficult in an 
urgent situation, but it requires careful planning in outreach and presentation. Another issue to 
consider is what technical skill level to aim for, but Carlo says that accuracy needs to be a priority: 
“We really tried to be thorough, but speak to people who have a reasonable level of 
computer literacy because otherwise there may not be much of a point. But not 
compromising with security was the big aim.” 
An important additional point, Carlo adds, is that the handbook has been very useful as a 
complement to face-to-face training, something she has been involved in several times with student 
journalists as well as working professionals: 
“With a trainer and a handbook it gives people the ability to self-teach to the extent they can 
and only use us for a bit of trouble shooting.” 
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Increasing numbers of universities, trade unions, organisations advocating online privacy, and other 
groups are offering options in the way of digital security training. There may be face-to-face training 
available, but also Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs).  
4.3 Dropboxes 
One simple solution that may be tempting is the service DropBox which allows you to set up an 
inbox where files can be uploaded. Dropbox has large advantages in that it is simple, free, and easily 
accessible on a wide scale. Many people know basically what it is and how to use it. 
The disadvantages however, are great.  It is unclear exactly how much access Dropbox as a company 
gives authorities or law enforcement agencies, but the whistleblower Edward Snowden has 
described DropBox as "hostile to privacy". Dropbox has previously stated that they can and will 
comply with legal requests to hand over information, which can put journalists and their sources at 
risk. A source can take their own steps using the TOR network as well as other disk encryption tools 
to make the transfer of data via a Dropbox substantially safer.  But DropBox is not to be considered 
very protective of those contents if law enforcement comes knocking. 
Other examples of encrypted submissions boxed use 
forms encrypted using HTTPS.  One such is 
“Radioleaks”, employed by Swedish public radio.  
Sweden is particularly interesting because of the high 
standard of source protection Swedish journalists are 
required to live up to by law. Radioleaks uses HTTPS 
technology to encrypt and protect the data traffic of 
persons uploading information to their site and claim 
to have received over a thousand tip-offs resulting in 
over a hundred actual news items, some of them very 
sensitive. For instance, after Swedish Radio broadcast the award-winning investigation into Swedish 
arms exports to Saudi Arabia, internal discussion at the Swedish Defence Research Agency about the 
fallout of the reporting was received via the Radioleaks service. 
HTTPS will protect traffic, but it won’t disguise who is visiting the Radioleaks site. Beyond that, as 
with HTTPS licenses in general, there has been much concern since the revelations of Edward 
Snowden that this system of security may in itself be compromised by exploits or backdoors 
available to USA and perhaps other powerful intelligence agencies.  
Finally, more and more media organisations have been choosing to set up submission inboxes using 
some form of onion routing based encryption, requiring the user to be connected to the TOR 
network in order to access the site where the submissions. Different alternatives to TOR have been 
developed, including “SecureDrop” and “GlobalLeaks”. 
SecureDrop, originally developed by the late Aaron Schwartz and Kevin Poulsen under the name 
“DeadDrop”, has been receiving quite a bit of attention recently, being used by The Guardian, 
   
 
19 
 
Washington Post, Forbes, and Pro-Publica among others. The New Yorker originally used an earlier 
version named “StrongBox” but is now using SecureDrop as well. 
SecureDrop sites, an official list of which are maintained, are only available to users of TOR. This 
means that users by definition have to protect themselves and their identity to some degree before 
they are even able to access the service. The prospective source can then access a separately set up 
server set up by the journalist or news organisation which does not record information about the 
visitor’s point of origin. The source or whistle-blower also receives randomly generated login 
information rather than using anything readily identifiable, thereby strengthening the anonymity 
further. 
Data or files received are moved from one computer to another using an USB memory stick. Along 
with a second memory stick, that contains the encryption key, these are both entered into a 
computer that is not connected to the internet and there the data is unlocked. 
Despite all these steps, media organisations maintain that absolute security is not something that 
can be guaranteed, only to a greater or lesser extent. It is fair to say that SecureDrop is at least safer 
than an email, depending of course on what other steps are taken both by journalist and source to 
guarantee that the data is safeguarded.   
4.5    Going old-school 
 
Finally, some journalists interviewed for this report 
said that they faced with uncertainty about the level 
of surveillance that they face, or uncertain of how to 
tackle potential threats, they would prefer not to use 
digital communication at all. Rather, a return to 
handwritten notes and verbal communication away 
from the office seems preferable to a technical 
solution. 
 
This does not, however, apply only to individuals 
sceptical to the ability their technical know-how. Arjen Kamphuis, quoted earlier in this report, says 
there may be extreme cases where this is necessary, if it is based on a sober assessment of the 
potential threats:  
 
 “If you’re under an extreme level of surveillance,” he says. “That may actually be a good 
assessment of the problem. If you’re Julian Assange you won’t trust anything with a power 
plug,”  
But most of us are not under that level of surveillance, he says: 
 “You can defeat almost any adversary on this planet with a little bit of budget and a little bit 
of time. It can still be done even today, even despite everything.”  
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5.  Conclusions 
Given what we today know about the technical surveillance abilities available to powerful actors and 
the lengths to which they are willing to go regardless of regulation, journalists face a serious 
dilemma. Are we able to offer sources guarantees of protection as long as we ourselves use digital 
communication that could potentially be eavesdropped upon? 
And given the proliferation of malware and other means of spying and snooping – available not only 
to governments but also to criminals, employers, the generally curious, and anyone who runs a 
website – it’s not a dilemma journalists can dismiss based on the notion that they are not doing any 
of that “Wikileaks stuff”. 
The issue is difficult to resolve for several reasons. One reason is limited technical know-how in the 
profession as a whole. How can we even start to answer the questions if we do not even have a 
working understanding of how a computer or the internet actually work? 
For some the solution is to avoid digital communication entirely, abandoning online communications 
and computers and instead reverting to analogue communications. But for how large a share of 
journalists is this actually an option? For better or for worse, we have grown dependent on digital 
communication and, importantly, so have our sources. 
This being the situation we most likely need to accept that most journalists will be using digital 
communications, and move forward from there. It is only by equipping journalists with the 
knowledge and tools to assess how vulnerable their communications are, they can make the 
judgment calls on a case-by-case basis. 
So how best to deliver the education? Is it through targeting students before they enter the 
profession, to select those in urgent need when they’re already working, or offering a blanket 
solution using freely available research and digital protection handbook? 
Stuart Hughes, Senior World Affairs Producer with the BBC points out that journalists in what are 
considered risky environments are expected to attend training sessions in physical security but not 
digital security, despite many of us spending more hours connected to the web in front of a screen 
than in the field. Can that line of reasoning yield an approach that will resolve at least some of these 
issues? 
The purpose of this report is not to answer that question, but rather to introduce journalists to the 
issues that they may be facing and some initiatives to tackle them. Technological developments will 
mean that any specific advice or suggestions of tools may soon become irrelevant and so it is up to 
each journalist to stay abreast of developments that affect their privacy. We hope that this report 
takes one step towards increasing awareness around source protection in a post-Snowden age and 
provides a starting point for journalists to educate themselves, seek out training and protect both 
their data and their sources. 
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